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Abstract— The utilization of Software-Defined Radios (SDR) 
has already become state-of-the-art for terrestrial Radio 
Frequency (RF) and wireless applications. The almost 
conservative space industry also identified the benefits of 
reconfigurable radio systems and uses SDRs on satellites and 
space vehicles. The traditional definition of a software-defined 
radio thereby  is the digital implementation of applications  in 
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) or Digital Signal 
Processors (DSP). The analog parts (e.g. RF components) of the 
radio are generally tailored to the application specification and 
are not, or only partly, configurable. With the release of 
programmable and reconfigurable Radio Frequency Integrated 
Circuits (RFIC), a new era of SDRs was declared, which allows 
more flexibility and higher performance into smaller dimension. 
Thus, making these benefits available for applications on 
spacecraft has been identified as a big challenge, since those 
technologies are not designed for the harsh environmental 
conditions in space. This paper presents an approach for a highly 
integrated and reliable Generic Software Defined-Radio (GSDR) 
platform design and the results of a pre-evaluation test under 
radiation conditions on a prototype, to investigate certain 
mitigation techniques and a preconceived selection of system 
components. Focus of this platform is the integration into a 
satellite system, in order to operate multiple RF and wireless 
communication applications, where typically specific units for 
each application are used. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Software-Defined Radios (SDRs) are becoming an 
important factor in Radio Frequency (RF) and wireless 
communication technologies, in order to increase flexibility, 
data throughput and scientific output. Many satellite 
communication systems, providing high throughput data links 
in Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) or scientifically satellites 
in low earth orbit, use flexible radio systems, in which 
baseband algorithms are implemented in Field Programmable 
Gate Arrays (FPGA) or Digital Signal Processors (DSP). The 
main advantage of this kind of radio is the potential to update 
the baseband processing algorithms (or applications) and to 
improve the performances while the satellite or spacecraft is 
 
already in space. Another major benefit of SDRs is the 
reduction of cost and size, since most data processing can be 
handled in a single chip. Even if these kinds of SDRs have a 
modular architecture, those systems are commonly designed 
for one particular service. This is caused by the specific 
requirements of each application, which are mainly related to 
the RF properties (down-/up conversion, RF bandwidth and 
signal strength) and the analog-digital conversion and vice 
versa. To fulfil those requirements, plenty components are 
needed to be selected for each application and for this reason, a 
multiple application platform for a wide frequency range is 
hard to design, with respect to small dimensions. The Institute 
of Space Systems of the German Aerospace Center (DLR) is 
working on this topic and has developed a first prototype for a 
Generic SDR (GSDR) platform with multi-band operation 
purposes on spacecraft. Goal of this SDR approach is to 
provide a reconfigurable and small platform, suitable also for 
low- and mid-class spacecraft missions. 
An important driver for SDR-based applications on 
satellite- and spacecraft missions is the reliability aspect, which 
strongly depends on the type of operated service. For example, 
a telecommunication broadcast service or a rescue application 
has a high priority in accessibility and reliability (high-class), 
while a failure or malfunction of an experimental and 
scientifically payload is often arguable (low/mid-class). Thus, 
the design of a SDR payload may vary extremely in cost, size, 
power budgets and performance. Most of the systems with a 
high claim of accessibility and reliability are based on 
expensive Radiation Hardened (RadHard) components and 
redundancies, whereby experimental payloads are often 
designed on a full Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) 
approach and a non-redundant architecture. With respect to 
achieve smaller dimensions, lower costs, short lead-times and 
high performances, a COTS-based design seems more 
promising for a highly integrated GSDR platform. Moreover, 
important system relevant components for this platform 
approach are currently not available space qualified. To fulfil 
also higher demands on reliability purposes, specific solutions 
have to be found, e.g. by evaluating radiation hardening 
strategies in hardware design and software. In this paper, we 
propose the design and architecture for a highly integrated and 
reliable multi-band SDR platform on a spacecraft. A detailed 
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design description is presented and a novel hybrid architecture 
is described, combining selected, well-known, COTS 
components, RadHard solutions and implemented mitigation 
techniques to detect and handle Single Event Effects (SEE) and 
being immune to Total Ionizing Dose (TID). Part of this 
process is a pre-evaluation test on a first prototype of the 
GSDR system and selected COTS candidates for further re- 
designs. 
A motivation of the GSDR platform development is given 
in section II. Section III presents the GSDR prototype pre- 
evaluation results, including the analysis of the signal 
constraints and radiation impacts. A radiation hardening 
architecture approach (hardware and software) is briefly 
presented in section IV and V. The conclusion of this paper 
will be summarized in section VI. 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
As already introduced in chapter I, the main intention of 
this R&D activities is to provide a highly integrated platform, 
which can perform different communication-related 
applications on a spacecraft, without a complete re-design by 
each mission and service. Applications, for example, are the 
telecommand- and telemetry unit of a spacecraft, which are 
usually defined as dedicated communication subsystem, or any 
kind of communication payload, e.g. the processing of 
transmitted signals by Aircrafts or Vessels [1]. With the release 
of highly integrated RF transceivers, the traditional definition 
of a SDR has been changed and multi-band operation on single 
platforms becomes practical. Thus, by multiplexing and 
scheduling, applications in different frequency bands can be 
operated in a single device, where usually multiple units were 
required. Making such advantages available for space would 
have a massive impact in payload- and subsystem design, with 
respect to configuration, flexibility, mechanical dimensions and 
mass properties. Major challenge for this transaction is to 
protect the system and their sensitive components against the 
harsh environmental conditions in space, since targeted and 
required technologies are mostly designed and available for the 
terrestrial ambience. 
 
A. Baseline design 
To allow fast integration and adaption, the GSDR system is 
configured as a mother- and daughterboard design. The RF 
daughterboard contains application specific RF circuits and 
components (e.g. filters, mixer and amplifiers) to maximize the 
performance, while the architecture of the GSDR motherboard 
is unchanged. Thus, the re-design and tailoring to other 
applications and services is limited to the RF daughterboard 
and results into low design costs and low complexity levels. 
The GSDR motherboard architecture is based on a System-on- 
Chip (SoC) signal processing module and a highly integrated 
RF transceiver unit, which allows the operation in a frequency 
range between 70MHz and 6GHz, without using additional RF 
equipment (e.g. up-converter). Volatile and non-volatile 
memories are used to provide computing resources to the SoC 
and data storage capacities for system- and payload data. 
Different interfaces (analog, digital and RF) are implemented 
in the design. A supervisor circuit observes the functionality of 
the  system  and  monitors  sensitive  units  to  prevent  data 
corruption and destructive damages of the appropriated device. 
The interconnection between the GSDR motherboard and the 
RF daughterboard is performed on differential data-lines and 
are transformed to single-ended on the RF daughterboard to 
minimize the interferences to the data. External data interfaces 
implemented on the GSDR system, which are commonly used 
for space applications, are Space-Wire (SpW) for high-speed 
data transfer and a Universal Asynchronous Receiver 
Transmitter (UART) serial interface, for command and control. 
Additional debug interfaces, which are not common for space 
application (e.g. Ethernet, USB etc.) are provided as well and 
can be enabled by user. 
 
B. Baseband Processing System 
The Baseband Processing System (BPS) is based on a 
Xilinx-7000 SoC device. The SoC is separated into a 
Processing System (PS), including an application processing 
unit, interconnects and memory interfaces, as well as a 
Programmable Logic (PL) based on a 28nm process, 
comparable to a Xilinx Aritx-7 FPGA fabric. The PS comes 
with a dual-core ARM A9 cortex, operating at a frequency of 
up to 866MHz. Advantage of such SoC technologies is that 
very fast, multiple and complex signal processing can be 
performed in the high-efficient FPGA fabric, while the data 
post-processing and interfacing to other system parts can be 
handled by the PS. Connected to the SoC is an assorted 
memory architecture with volatile- and non-volatile memory 
options. Due to the 64-bit AXI-Interface, it is possible to push 
and capture data between the DDR Memory (DDRM), 
connected to the PS, and the RF transceiver unit, which is 
interfaced to the PL. 
 
C. RF Transceiver Unit 
The RF transceiver unit combines the RF signal processing, 
converting, and digitization (and vice-versa) in one single 
device. The selected AD9361 agile transceiver (Analog 
Devices) uses two independent transmitter and receiver chains, 
whereby each receiver chain has three RF inputs and the 
transmitter chains contain two separated outputs. An overview 
of the AD9361 agile transceiver system is shown in Fig. 1. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  AD9361 overview in block design 
Those in- and outputs are multiplexed and can be used to attach 
different, application specific, RF circuit for performance- 
enhancement. Due to the 2x2 transceiver chain constellation, 
Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) services are also 
applicable. 
The AD9361 RFIC is based on a 65nm CMOS process, 
which makes the device sensitive to SEE, in particular to 
Single Event Upsets (SEU). These conditions have been 
identified as one of the most critical issues in the system 
design, since all configurations of the RFIC are register-based. 
 
III. PRE-EVALUATION ON A GSDR PROTOTYPE 
To identify critical issues on non-negligible system 
components and to analyze signal constraints on the analog, 
digital and RF side, a first (all-COTS) prototype has been 
developed. A picture of this prototype at a Total Ionizing Dose 
(TID) test is given in Fig. 2 and selected results, in particular 
the AD9361 performance under ionizing dose effects, are 
presented in the following section. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.  GSDR Prototype board at TID test 
 
The results of these pre-evaluation tests will have a massive 
influence on further development steps in order to radiation 
hardening and fault-tolerant enhancement of the GSDR system. 
 
A. Analyzed signal constraint 
To give an example about the importance of pre-analysis of 
the signal constraints, Fig. 3 shows the current on the Double 
Data Rate Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory 
(DDR RAM) at 1.5V DC for an AIS receiver application [2]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Dynamic signal constraints for current at DDR3 1.5V DC 
The current levels are highly dynamic and it was observed 
that these conditions strictly depend on the conducted 
application. These signal constraints are important to design 
latch-up protections and determine correct current-limit 
thresholds. Dynamic current conditions are also observed on 
the SD-Card and the non-volatile memory attached to the BPS 
due to read- and write operations. Static current values (e.g. 
RFIC, BPS) also depend on the conducted application. 
 
B. Impact of TID effects 
TID degradation effects of devices are caused by charged 
particles and gamma rays that create critical ionization. To 
evaluate the system behavior under ionizing  conditions, 
selected parameters, like voltage regulator outputs, applied 
current levels and RF-Transceiver performances were 
monitored. Fig. 4 shows the output voltage and applied current 
of the 5V DC main input voltage regulator. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Characteristic of the GSDR prototype 5V DC voltage regulator during 
TID test 
 
After a dose of 8kRad, the regulator output voltage starts to 
increase continuously until the voltage level reaches the 
maximum allowed input voltage the following  powered 
devices. At this point, and a dose of 17.5kRad, the test was 
aborted to protect the system of permanent damages. This 
radiation behavior was observed at different other regulators in 
the system and has been categorized as medium-critical for the 
further development. In addition, selected devices (e.g. multi- 
channel voltage regulator) for the further GSDR system design 
have been tested, that shows robustness to TID effects up to a 
dose of 45kRad. Deviations of other system components (e.g. 
Oscillators) specifications and functionalities during the TID 
test were not overserved. In particular the RFIC has shown 
strength robustness against the irradiated ionizing dose. On a 
second test-board, the RFIC parameters were evaluated against 
TID at room temperature (21°C). Therefore, only the RFIC has 
been irradiated and other system components have been 
shielded. For the receiver’s evaluation, a 1MHz sine-wave of 
0dBm was transmitted at a carrier frequency of 900MHz, 
2.4GHz and 5.5GHz to test the complete supported frequency 
range of the RFIC. The receiver’s adjustable gain control over 
TID is shown in Fig. 5. 
 
 
Fig. 5.  RFIC adjustable gain control for 1dB, 21dB, 46dB and 71dB gain at a 
carrier frequency of 2.4GHz of Rx1 and Rx2 
 
No significant gain-deviation on both receiver chains (RX1, 
RX2) was observed until a final dose of 25kRad was achieved. 
Other receiver-related specifications like noise figure, 
Automatic Gain Control (AGC) performance or scattering 
parameter were also evaluated without any remarkable 
degradation effects. A test with modulated signals, to analyze 
the demodulation accuracy or receiver sensitivity was not 
performed during this test. For a carrier frequency of 800MHz 
and 5.5GHz no appreciable results are given, since no 
significant deviations were noted. 
For the transmitter’s evaluation, similar test conditions 
were determined, which include the test of maximum output 
power stability at a 1MHz tone with a carrier frequency of 
800MHz, 2.4GHz and 5GHz, the power control (adjustable 
attenuation) functionality and the transmitter’s intermodulation 
distortions. In Fig. 6, the maximum output power of both 
transmitters including cable-losses of ~10dB is presented. The 
output power varies between -2.5dBm and -3.1dBm, which is 
not assumed to be an effect of irradiation since a variation, 
caused by TID, will follows a uniform direction. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.  RFIC maximum output power vs. TID of a 1MHz sine-wave at 2.4 
GHz carrier frequency. 
In Fig. 7 the results of a TX intermodulation test for different 
attenuation vs. TID is presented. The plots show the TX 
amplitude of the fundamental tones (1MHz and 2MHz), as well 
as magnitudes of the 3rd and 5th order for three different 
attenuation levels (-1dB, -11dB and -21dB). 
 
 
Fig. 7. RFIC TX intermodulation vs. TID for a 1MHz  and  2MHz 
fundamental tone at  1dB, 11dB  and 21dB  attenuation and  a carrier 
frequncy of 2.4 GHz. 
 
The results show that the intermodulation distortion does 
not change with increasing TID levels, which proves that the 
TX amplifier linearity does not change during irradiation. In 
addition, attenuation levels are also not affected by TID. 
Interfaces- and general functionality (configurations) tests 
of the AD9361 were also performed without any restriction. 
 
IV. RADIATION HARDENING HARDWARE ARCHITECTURE 
Based  on  the  pre-evaluation  of  the  GSDR  prototype, 
different changes in the design- and component selections are 
required, in order to ensure a reliable and full-functional 
system in space. Talking about reliability for space application 
is often associated with high costs, long lead times and large 
components-sizes, resulting from the utilization of RadHard 
devices. Moreover, due to the fact that the selected highly 
integrated RFIC is not available space qualified, a detailed 
investigation on system hardening strategies for radiation 
effects is mandatory. Therefore, it is essential to understand 
which part of the system may be sensitive to radiation 
environments and needs to be protected. The selection of 
COTS- or RadHard devices strictly depends on the availability 
and the reliability priority in each individual functional block 
of the system. The power distribution block, for example, is 
classified with a high priority, since radiation effects can 
determine that the output voltage runs out of specification and 
results into destructive damages of the following devices. 
Plenty researches have demonstrated that a number of COTS 
devices are capable to withstand at least high TID [3]. Main 
problem with COTS devices is that manufactures have 
different parts screening- and qualification approaches and 
there is usually a non-visible process-documentation, which 
disables the chance to identify parts of certain lots. Thus, 
selecting COTS parts for the system design requires at least a 
good visibility of the manufacturing process and, in best case, 
flight heritage or access to radiation test reports. If none of 
these requirements can be satisfied, a space qualified solutions 
should be considered. In addition, there are different failure 
mitigation techniques that increase the system reliability, 
without the utilization of space qualified components. In the 
following sections, radiation hardening strategies by hardware 
design are presented for functional system blocks. 
 
A. Memory Ressources 
The BPS contains a hardened PS memory interface unit. 
This memory interface unit includes a dynamic memory 
controller and static memory interface modules. The GSDR 
uses two DDR3 memory devices, totaling to a density of 
512MB with Error Correction Code (ECC) enabled. Thus, 
failures in the data transmission between the PS and the 
dynamic RAM can be corrected during operation. A 8Gb 
NAND-Flash supports non-volatile memory for boot images, 
initialization procedures and sensitive data storage.  The 
selected NAND flash is a radiation tested COTS device and the 
manufacturing traceability is sufficient [4]. Moreover, different 
vendors offer radiation-tolerant NAND-Flashes, which are 
based on the same die. Magnetoresistive RAM (MRAM) 
devices, which are known to be tolerant to SEU, are used for 
backup storage of sensitive system and payload data. 
 
B. Power Regulation 
To support the complex architecture with unit- and device 
specific power, an aggregate regulation and distribution system 
is required, that provides up to seven different voltage levels. 
Since there is no multi-channel voltage regulator available at 
space qualification level, a solution has to be found to achieve 
both, a highly integrated and small design and a high claim of 
reliability under radiation conditions. Integrated, multi-channel, 
solutions have already been tested against TID effects and 
shows good robustness up to 45kRad, as shown in Fig. 8. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8.  Output  voltages  of  a  selected  multi-channel  voltage  regulator  vs. 
radiation dose up to 45kRad. 
 
Unfortunately, there are no characteristics of SEE, in particular 
of Single Event Transients (SET).  SET occurs in different 
strength and length and can lead into a destructive damage of 
the powered devices. Thus, at least an Overvoltage Protection 
(OVP) circuit is required on every power-line that protects 
voltage inputs of devices against fast and heavy transients. SEE 
characterization of the chosen multi-channel power regulator is 
scheduled and might have influence of the final system design. 
In worst case, a full space qualified power regulation solutions 
is feasible, but leads into a very large, inefficient and expensive 
design. 
 
C. Health monitoring and supervising circuits 
Since most of the GSDR system components are preferable 
based on COTS, it is assumed that radiation effects will 
decrease the system reliability, even if they claimed space 
heritage or radiation test data are available. To avoid such 
impairment, several health monitoring tasks and supervising 
circuits are implemented into the design. Those mechanisms 
for example, are based on current sensing and voltage 
monitoring nodes, to protect the system against SEL and SET. 
The SEL detection is partly realized via the Xilinx Analog- 
Digital Converter (XADC) of the BPS and a current-sense 
monitoring network within the power regulation unit. The 
XADC includes a dual 12-bit ADC with a sampling rate of 
1MSPS. The XADC is able to monitor up to 17 external 
differential signals. Moreover, the XADC monitors internal 
voltages and core temperatures of the SoC. A routine is reading 
the external voltages continuously with a maximum sampling 
rate of 1/17MSPS (inputs are multiplexed) and interacts with 
the power regulation unit to shut down the system, if a non- 
conformance is detected. The current-sensing monitoring 
network is realized by shunt-resistors and high accuracy 
current-sense amplifiers. These amplifiers are required since 
the monitored voltage-drop over the shunt resistor is too low 
for the XADC. Selected current-sense amplifiers have also 
been tested against TID effects as shown in Fig. 9 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.  Output voltages of a selected current-sense monitor vs. radiation dose 
up to 45kRad. 
 
The results show no gain-deviation and a stable output 
voltage. The different noise levels (min to max swings) depend 
on the sampling rates, which have been changed after breaks 
during the test (7.5kRad, 17.5Krad and final dose). 
 
D. RF Transceiver 
As already been mentioned, the AD9361 is categorized as 
one of the most sensitive and critical devices in the system with 
respect to SEEs. To ensure that the RF transceiver 
configuration won’t be corrupted by a SEU or permanently 
damaged by a SEL, the RF transceiver unit is implemented 
dual redundant. Thus, different fault-tolerant mechanisms are 
convertible to improve the reliability against SEUs and 
destructive failures. 
1) Cold Redundancy 
A cold redundancy is useful if one of the RFICs will be 
permanently damaged by a SEE, or the harsh environmental 
surrounding. This mechanism does not require additional 
algorithms, but does not prevent corruptions by SEU. 
2) Signal Comparison 
Signal comparison is comparable to warm/hot redundancy, 
where the signals simultaneously and independently from each 
device are processed by the BPS. A signal deviation can be 
detected afterwards, which may suggest to a SEU in one of the 
RFIC configuration. 
3) Toggle-mode 
In this mode only one RFIC (A) is in nominal operation 
while the other RFIC (B) will be re-configured. After the re- 
initialization, the previous active RFIC (A) will be re- 
configured and the pre-initialized RFIC (B) will run in nominal 
mode. The re-configuration and initialing time is about 10ms, 
which allows a quick toggle-interval. Thus, it shall minimize 
the influence by SEUs and allows a reliable operation of the 
RF transceiver unit. 
However, it depends on the operable application, which of 
the described fault-tolerant mechanisms is more promising and 
suitable. 
 
V. RADIATION HARDENING SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE  
The software architecture of the GSDR platform approach 
is important to provide a framework for rapid and easy 
implementation of different applications and to improve the 
reliability of the system in addition to radiation hardening 
strategies by hardware design. This chapter briefly introduces 
the operational concept and framework for the integration of 
SDR applications and describes several mechanisms for 
software reliability assurances. 
 
A. Operational concept 
Applications are basically realized in Hardware Description 
Language (HDL) and are integrated into the reference GSDR 
system design on the PL. On PS, the GSDR platform runs a 
tailored, lightweight Linux-based Operation System (OS). The 
application processed data of the HDL design are captured by a 
multi-buffer routine, which is implemented into the RF 
transceiver driver. Those data are processed through the OS by 
saving-operations or additional signal processing algorithms. 
Application independent routines are running in background, 
performing system health checks, data storage and fault- 
indication and handling. Due to multi-boot mechanisms, the 
system can be reconfigured between different applications and 
provide fall-back operation, if an image is invalid (corrupted). 
 
B. Software Reliability Assurance 
The GSDR system supports a boot-up sequence to verify 
the correctness of the loaded boot image from the NAND flash 
memory via RSA authentication. In case of a corrupted image, 
the boot sequence features a fall-back option to the next valid 
image. Once the image is loaded correctly (bitstream has been 
flashed into the FPGA and the OS is running), several 
mechanisms ensure error detection and correction, e.g. by ECC 
in the DDR3 memory. ECC is also available for non-volatile 
memories to mitigate corruption of payload-data or bootable 
images. During the nominal operation mode, three internal 
watchdogs (1x ARM L1 Core, 1x ARM L2 Core and 1x 
monitoring external device) are enabled and trigger an interrupt 
in case of a system crash or a program-execution problem. The 
flashed bitstream into the FPGA is supported by a Soft Error 
Mitigation (SEM) IP-Core, which detects and restores bit-flips 
in the FPGA configuration. Additional configuration- and 
register scrubbing mechanisms are utilized to support SEU 
mitigation in the FPGA, Memory and RFIC configuration [5]. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper the system design and architecture of a fault- 
tolerant, highly integrated and generic SDR platform for RF 
applications on spacecraft was presented. Particular focus was 
made in the design of using selected COTS devices and 
implementing certain mitigation techniques, to enhance the 
system reliability under the hash environmental conditions in 
space. Pre-evaluation test results on a GSDR prototype and 
promising future system parts (e.g. multi-channel power 
regulator) were presented. These results have an important 
influence on further development steps, the selection of 
sensitive system components and the design of hardening 
mechanism for radiation effects, to increase the system 
reliability. Those reliability assurances were separated into 
hardware and software aspects, whereby the software reliability 
assurance was only briefly introduced. 
In future works, the actual prototype will be re-designed by 
the presented approaches. The result of this development is 
going to be analyzed and verified for a small satellite mission 
of the DLR, which includes mechanical-, electrical-, and 
environmental test conditions. In particular, thermal-vacuum- 
and radiation tests (TID and SEE) are scheduled to evaluate the 
fault-tolerant approaches and to decide if further re-designs are 
required. 
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